In other contexts, judicial condemnation does not automatically follow from proof that public officers have deliberately broken the law,  and in their dealings with bureaucracy, the general public has often depended upon the willingness of public officials to bend the rules. The plaintiff in one case had been convicted on the basis of evidence that the police had obtained, from a third party, by deliberately breaking the law.
Several of the leading judgments proceed as if liability will always result from proof of targeted malice,  but two obvious qualifications are needed. In these circumstances, the misfeasance claim will need to meet the requirements of knowledge of the illegality or reckless indifference to the risk of illegality. Secondly, malice is not always a shortcut to liability in misfeasance, a point that Harper J made in Grimwade v Victoria. Most cases treat Roncarelli v Duplessis  as a modern paradigm of misfeasance, although the term itself played no part in the case.
That he wished harm to Mr Roncarelli was indisputable, and if it was relevant, his reasons were also clearly ultra vires, although his intervention was even more clearly invalid because the power of permit cancellation belonged to the Liquor Commissioner, not the Premier. However, only Abbott J said that Minister Duplessis knew he was breaking the law;  the other judgments treated Duplessis as having assumed that he was acting lawfully, which meant that he was not deliberately indifferent as to the law. If targeted malice meaning the deliberate infliction of harm provides no more than a strong but rebuttable presumption  that the defendant knew that he or she was exceeding the law, and if Minister Duplessis is to be taken as having broken the law entirely inadvertently, then he would nowadays escape liability under that head.
He would likewise escape liability for reckless indifference, because his illegality was not advertent. Today, Minister Duplessis should escape misfeasance liability for want of relevant fault; he was objectively reckless but not subjectively indifferent. As explained below, that could be misleading these days, because it suggests the need either for an antecedent relationship between the parties or for a legal duty requiring the defendant to have the plaintiff in mind.
If there is a duty nowadays, it is to not deliberately abuse a public power, and expressed at that level, it is not very useful. It is instructive to track the history of the search for a meaningful action for breach of duty. Tort law has a long history of experimentation with actions for breach of duties which might in some sense be characterised as duties of a public nature.
Some say that the story starts with the second Statute of Westminster. Then there was the relatively short-lived proposition that an action would lie for breach of a public duty. First aired in ,  it appears that this doctrine was intended to link up a number of previously distinct actions against those charged with duties towards the public for neglect, non-performance, or even abuse of office. According to Paul Finn, the courts voiced concerns that so unrestricted a basis of public liability would have ruinous consequences for public authorities, particularly in light of the massive expansion of statutory authorities with finite budgets charged with the performance of public duties.
The action for breach of public duty morphed into a narrower but always uncertain tort for breach of statutory duty. In purely numerical terms, there are far more duties sourced to statute than to the common law, and the puzzle for the courts has always been how to set principled and predictively useful parameters for the statutory tort. Holt CJ himself had said something in support of an action for breach of statutory duty,  but that was obiter, and the action cannot be said to have been firmly established until the last quarter of the 19 th century.
Some of the leading judgments read as if there were rebuttable presumptions of statutory construction, but others give more credit to the judge than to legislative drafters in determining whether the relevant Act has created a cause of action. That certainly appears to have been one of the reasons why the Canadian Supreme Court abolished the tort, folding it into negligence.
Having regard to the evolution of the statutory tort from earlier doctrines that focused on breach of public duty, what is particularly noteworthy is how rarely the statutory tort is applied for what might loosely be called maladministration by public authorities. One of the big factors in favour of implying a right of action is that the statutory duty might otherwise lack an adequate sanction for its breach. The requirement that the statutory duty have been enacted for the benefit of the plaintiff or a class to which the plaintiff belongs also weighs heavily against its application to public authorities.
Regulatory and social welfare schemes, for example, are said to have been passed for the benefit of society at large rather than for particular classes such as the homeless or the unemployed. The development of the public law injunction was achieved by a liberalisation of the standing rules, such that plaintiffs could seek injunctions against public wrongs even if they had no legal or equitable rights under threat, provided that they suffered or would suffer damage peculiar to themselves.
Finally, Lord Hoffmann wondered aloud whether plaintiffs might occasionally albeit rarely be entitled to damages in negligence, on the ground, in effect, of Wednesbury unreasonableness. His Lordship had thought this possible if a body exercising public power had failed to exercise a statutory power to confer a benefit upon the plaintiff in circumstances where the only lawful option on the facts had been to confer that benefit.
However, that idea was abandoned shortly afterwards, in a case that reaffirmed the distinction between a statutory duty enforceable by mandamus and a common law duty of care, which remained a precondition to an award of damages in negligence. Although misfeasance is classified as an intentional tort,  it now stretches to include actual reckless indifference, in which the indifference is defined subjectively so as to exclude the defendant who failed to think of a risk that any reasonable person would have foreseen.
The liability of public authorities in negligence is usually assessed on the same basis as the liability of anyone else, but where the complaint relates to an activity that has no close private sector analogue or raises issues best left to the political branches, the courts deploy a number of control devices that limit or even deny a duty of care, or that limit the amount of liability. In essence, the judges shape the contours of negligence in response to certain types of relational or cost—benefit considerations and in response to operational pressures on the defendant.
At common law, for example, authorities investigating possible child abuse owe no duty of care to suspect parents;  regulators of nursing homes might well owe a duty of care to the residents, but not to the operators;  in most places, the police owe no duty of care to potential victims in their task of crime prevention;  and litigants even if they are public authorities owe no duty of care to their opponents. Lawyers can be liable for getting the law wrong because they are legal professionals; even so, their liability is usually limited to their clients or those the client seeks to benefit.
Furthermore, one would expect the duty usually to be discharged by obtaining legal advice. Misfeasance has adopted none of these strategies in response to fears that it might overreach, burdening individual defendants or their governments with potentially unlimited liability for what might have been an entirely understandable if wrong excess of public zeal. These distinctions between negligence and misfeasance, therefore, go considerably beyond the difference between accidental and advertent risk-taking. Without the interposition of a common law duty of care, and with actionability being possible for deliberate or consciously indifferent breach of statutory duties to assist or protect the public, the tort may yet show signs of strain.
Reckless indifference in misfeasance law, therefore, is not about want of care because it has no predicate of a duty of care. Indeed, misfeasance can apply in the absence of any duty lying upon the defendant or correlative right inhering in the plaintiff, the most obvious example being the case where the defendant deliberately and unlawfully refuses to exercise a discretionary function.
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This was not always the case, however. In other words, if there was any misfeasance, its only compensable victims had been the third-party witnesses, because only they were owed duties not to be improperly coerced. The joint judgment in Mengel quoted Tampion without apparent disapproval. Spigelman CJ said that misfeasance covers abuse of powers and duties ,  and Macfarlan JA was disposed to say that if there must be a duty, then it need be owed only to the public generally, or perhaps to a class to which the plaintiff belongs.
The issue in Leerdam and Cannon was whether misfeasance could be founded upon breaches by legal practitioners of their ethical duties towards a court or tribunal. Their misconduct would therefore be an insufficient basis for a misfeasance action unless as discussed below in Part XI the tort were to extend beyond illegality, to include abuse of position or influence.
That is not to deny the relevance of distinguishing duties from powers. In the case of lost future benefits that are contingent on the future exercise of a discretionary power, the court cannot determine how those discretions should be exercised. There are some who regret the absence in misfeasance of a right—duty relationship between the parties.
There is little if any need for doctrines of standing, proximity or remoteness in the case of targeted malice, where the moral case for full recovery is plain. The cases concerning the mental elements of the tort of misfeasance, however, now appear to have established a moral equivalence between consciously indifferent risk-taking whether as to illegality or the potential for harm , and the knowing use of illegal means for the deliberate infliction of harm. That moral equivalence applies both to cases of power and duty.
It might now become necessary to set some additional criteria connecting the defendant and the plaintiff, and some limits to the harms for which the defendant might be liable. The allegations against the Bank of England in Three Rivers were always highly implausible, but imagine if the plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing that at some point, the Bank had just dithered for some considerable time after it had reached the conclusion that the crooked bank it was meant to be regulating simply could not be saved.
It held that these restraints were unnecessary in light of its requirement that a misfeasance tortfeasor must at the very least have consciously decided to risk inflicting probable harm on the plaintiff or on a class to which the plaintiff belonged. The Court of Appeal declared that Three Rivers was mistaken in ever thinking that there was a problem. He was at large at the time of the murder because the authorities had interfered with the proper handling of serious charges relating to drugs, offensive weapons, and rape, all of which they knew he had committed whilst improperly released.
They had also known that he had entered the country illegally, but they had procured a temporary visa to get over that problem. They had known that he was extremely dangerous, because he had told them that he had murdered people in his home country. In terms of Three Rivers , therefore, they had known of the probability of him committing a violent crime, and the issue was whether it mattered that the authorities could have had no idea who his next victim might be. The Court held that any suggestion in Three Rivers that the defendant must have appreciated risk to a class of probable victims  was both obiter and misguided.
The case for liability in all three instances supposed in Akenzua is indeed strong, but it fails to overcome the Three Rivers concern for articulating some limits to liability. Akenzua is almost unique in misfeasance law, which hardly ever sees claims for personal injury or death. The Court said that one could not reasonably expect government officials to suspend all action every time they encountered legal doubt.
The moral case for a misfeasance tort is typically put as the need for protection from a deliberate abuse of coercive state power over the subject, but in fact, the tort has always gone wider than the improper use of coercive power — it has always covered wilful refusals to perform duties to provide protection for the subject. The duty cases are harder to prove than the coercive power cases, because a mere omission to perform a duty is not enough. The requirement of subjective fault means that defendants must either have decided not to perform a duty of which they were aware, or have consciously decided not to care whether they were under a duty.
The Canadian Supreme Court allowed such a claim to go forward in Odhavji , leaving for future consideration the difficult issue of whether the family had suffered tortiously recognised psychiatric harm. She alleged that the Council had imposed a restriction upon her use of that property out of spite and revenge. The parallel criminal offence of misfeasance or misconduct in public office is unconcerned with whether the power is public or private, focusing instead on the status of the public officer and the gravity of his or her misconduct.
The gist of the statutory offence is the improper use of either the power or the influence that comes with the position,  and the common law offence can be committed by serious misconduct that disgraces the office. It is difficult to know what to make of Jones. In terms of principle, it is hard to justify a liability rule whose imposition turns solely on whether the defendant is public or private.
Decisions such as Odhavji and Garrett prompt speculation as to the assumption made in most other cases that the exercise of the power or refusal to perform the duty must occur in circumstances warranting a judicial review declaration of invalidity. Invalidity, however, is only one way of establishing unlawfulness. Hitching misfeasance to invalidity in these cases is no more than an unintended hangover from the failed campaign to extend the negligence action to loss caused by careless invalidity.
Regardless of whether misfeasance applies only to the performance of public functions, a question remains as to whether it can apply to the judiciary. The cases require not just that defendants be guilty of an abuse of a public power, duty or possibly office, but also that they have been public officers.
The precedents undoubtedly support this additional requirement, but it is otherwise difficult to justify. Abolition, however, is an option available only to the highest courts,  who have declared that the defendant must be a public officer. There are many cases discussing the extent to which private bodies or individuals may be subject to the processes of judicial review if they can be said in some sense to be performing public functions. In misfeasance, however, the issue is likely to be more important, because its principles currently apply only to defendants who not only exercise public power but are also public officers.
Brennan J referred to an old definition of public officers, which in essence contained two elements. First, they must have been appointed to perform a public duty. Secondly, they must be remunerated, although that may come in the form of money or land from the Crown, or fees from the public. A person might be a public employee but not a public officer.
Lawyers from the private profession increasingly conduct court and tribunal work for government clients, and some concern has been raised as to whether their contractual status should make any difference. It is unlikely that a person whose only powers and responsibilities flow from contract would be treated as a public officer for misfeasance purposes.
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The other and more straightforward reason is that they are unlikely to be exercising specifically public powers or duties. In brief, the alleged misconduct was criminal entrapment to pay a bribe; an entrapment authorised at very senior levels within the public sector. Its first reason was that the Commonwealth could act only through agents, and its second reason was that the Commonwealth does not itself hold public office. The second reason puts form over substance. It would be preferable to rebadge the tort as abuse of public power or position, if it were to extend beyond instances of public law invalidity ; the deliberate abuse of public power is no less serious if committed by either a public employee who holds no office or a government contractor performing a governmental function.
Any concern about imposing misfeasance liability on low-level staff is misplaced. Low-ranking staff are unlikely to have enough power to abuse.
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Further, they are even less likely to know whether they are abusing that power, and if they are consciously indifferent about that abuse, they are highly unlikely to be adjudged reckless for having decided to give no further thought to the legal limits to their power. Unlike their individual members, companies and public bodies have no minds of their own.
That does not prevent public bodies from being directly liable for misfeasance. In the right circumstances, the mental state of their staff can be imputed to the organisations themselves. For example, if all the members of a local government council voted unanimously to cancel a land use development consent, and if they did that entirely out of a sense of revenge and self-interest, and in the knowledge that they were acting illegally, then they will have been guilty of bad faith sufficient for the purposes of misfeasance.
In such a case, the council will be fixed with the mental state of the individuals comprising its governing body, and will be directly rather than vicariously liable in misfeasance for the harm it caused. The issue then becomes whether the public bodies for which they worked can be fixed with vicarious liability. Two concerns have been raised concerning the possibility of vicarious liability. Because the minimum requisite mental state comes close to dishonesty, and because illegality is required, doubts have arisen as to whether the misconduct of misfeasance tortfeasors can properly be regarded as an incident of their employment.
The common law does not impose vicarious liability on employers where the relevant tort was committed in the exercise of an independent discretion.
If you get on a site like Tradingview there are thousands of indicators. Forget that. It will only confuse you. Figure out moving averages, stochastic RSI, trend lines and the basics of candlesticks, upwards and downwards channels, bull flags, breakouts and wedges. Forget everything else for now. Just forget it. One of the mistakes I see way too often in new traders is a tendency to memorize a hundred patterns from bull flags to head and shoulders and reverse head and shoulders only to find them everywhere.
Chart 2: Imaginary Head and Shoulders. It kind of, sort of looks like a head and shoulders, but in the context of the overall pattern a three week long downtrend this is nothing but a few little bounces after climbing back up over the bar moving average, which you see in the blue line. The other way this manifests is when there is no clear pattern yet but you find one anyway.
Some days there are just no trades to make. You have to stay out of the game or wait for the pattern to come into focus. Chart 3: WTF? I see crazy stuff like this all the time on Twitter, usually with a LOT more green fan lines. What does this actually tell you? It tells you the coin can go in just about any direction. You goal is to correctly predict the next direction not state the obvious that it could go in any direction. This is less than worthless. The second way this shows up is when traders pile all kinds of lines onto their charts in lieu of a real trend.
The question is how does that help you make a decision? Your goal it to correctly predict the next price trend not state the obvious that it can go in any direction. Long term patterns are much easier to trade than short term ones. A short term pattern can easily be a mirage. But a long term pattern that develops over weeks or a month holds a lot of weight. You should look at what a coin is doing over a week, a few weeks, a month, three months, a year. The more you pull back the more obvious some patterns become. I have found that more than anything, a few basic trend lines at the top and bottom of the chart are mostly all that I need.
Chart 4: Baby Pips channel illustration from their excellent basic patterns course. Check out the free course here. Once you know channels you can start making good decisions. Channels are your best friend in charting. Learn channels. It may actually be the only thing you need to know in TA chart 4. Almost everything is a channel the closer you look. Head and shoulders? Cup and handle? Curved channel. Rising wedge? If you pull back to a month on a typical coin you will see a very clear tunnel going up or down. You want to ignore the outliers and see the general movement of the coin.
Nothing is perfect. Try to connect three or more points. Chart 5: A long downward channel slide for Dash. This happened over a month or so. Any long trade will lose you money here until it stops that ski slope decline. Note I have highlighted a small chance at a breakout in red. This is the first break of the pattern. Still, be careful. Wait for confirmation for a day or two. There are only three major types of channels: up, down or sideways. If a coin has gone down for a month in a channel and it suddenly breaks out of that pattern, pay close attention.
Be patient and wait for it to confirm a change. Chart 6: BTC tried to break out of its slump several times, popping above the top of the downward channel but each time it fell back into the channel. When it finally broke free it showed a dynamic push skyward, which is circled in red.
You are looking for a real change in direction, not a guess. The same is true of upward channels. Reversals to the downside happen faster, while uptrends tend to move slower before taking off like a rocket. Just get the hell out when a coin starts to slow in its upwards channel. Sideways channels are the most challenging. If the coin then falls back to the top of the channel and the ceiling becomes the floor, then you might just have something there.
Chart 7: OMG was going up along the green trend line for a month. It suddenly broke it and went sideways. Other traders I knew were still calling bullish. When a coin does this get out. After such a long rise the trend is likely down, which is exactly what happened over the next few days. When a coin is trading in a channel for an extended period of time and it suddenly breaks out of that channel up, down or sideways, pay close attention. This one is a classic. Everyone makes this mistake. You want more, so you rush back in.
You rush to dump before you lose anymore. Look at me! I made way to many entries and exits in what is basically just a sideways channel. I racked up brokerage fees, made almost no money and made myself sick with worry doing it. This is a massive mistake. The fool hears the truth a million times and never gets it.
The wise man only has to hear it a hundred thousand times before he get it. That means that even fools and kings have to make the same mistakes a lot.
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There is no escaping it. The difference is whether you wake up one day and realize you were doing it or just keep blithely throwing your money down the toilet. Emotions will screw you up bad in trading. They make you delusional. You need to ignore these delusions and focus. This one is the worst. We believe that God justifies and sanctifies those who by grace have faith in Jesus, and that he will one day glorify them—all to the praise of his glorious grace. In love God commands and implores all people to repent and believe, having set his saving love on those he has chosen and having ordained Christ to be their Redeemer.
This good news is biblical his death and resurrection are according to the Scriptures , theological and salvific Christ died for our sins, to reconcile us to God , historical if the saving events did not happen, our faith is worthless, we are still in our sins, and we are to be pitied more than all others , apostolic the message was entrusted to and transmitted by the apostles, who were witnesses of these saving events , and intensely personal where it is received, believed, and held firmly, individual persons are saved.
We believe that, moved by love and in obedience to his Father, the eternal Son became human: the Word became flesh, fully God and fully human being, one Person in two natures. The man Jesus, the promised Messiah of Israel, was conceived through the miraculous agency of the Holy Spirit, and was born of the virgin Mary.
He perfectly obeyed his heavenly Father, lived a sinless life, performed miraculous signs, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, arose bodily from the dead on the third day, and ascended into heaven. We believe that by his incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and ascension, Jesus Christ acted as our representative and substitute.
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He did this so that in him we might become the righteousness of God: on the cross he canceled sin, propitiated God, and, by bearing the full penalty of our sins, reconciled to God all those who believe. By his resurrection Christ Jesus was vindicated by his Father, broke the power of death and defeated Satan who once had power over it, and brought everlasting life to all his people; by his ascension he has been forever exalted as Lord and has prepared a place for us to be with him. We believe that salvation is found in no one else, for there is no other name given under heaven by which we must be saved.
Because God chose the lowly things of this world, the despised things, the things that are not, to nullify the things that are, no human being can ever boast before him—Christ Jesus has become for us wisdom from God—that is, our righteousness, holiness, and redemption. We believe that Christ, by his obedience and death, fully discharged the debt of all those who are justified.
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By his perfect obedience he satisfied the just demands of God on our behalf, since by faith alone that perfect obedience is credited to all who trust in Christ alone for their acceptance with God. Inasmuch as Christ was given by the Father for us, and his obedience and punishment were accepted in place of our own, freely and not for anything in us, this justification is solely of free grace, in order that both the exact justice and the rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners.
We believe that a zeal for personal and public obedience flows from this free justification. We believe that this salvation, attested in all Scripture and secured by Jesus Christ, is applied to his people by the Holy Spirit. He convicts the world of sin, righteousness, and judgment, and by his powerful and mysterious work regenerates spiritually dead sinners, awakening them to repentance and faith, baptizing them into union with the Lord Jesus, such that they are justified before God by grace alone through faith alone in Jesus Christ alone.